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I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
A foreign state is presumptively immune from suit, and its property presumptively im-
mune from attachment and execution, unless an exception enumerated in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) applies. In Republic ofArgentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,
the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the question of whether a foreign state's immunity from
attachment and execution under the FSIA itself limits discovery concerning a foreign sov-
ereign's extraterritorial assets.' In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court (Scalia, J.) answered the
question in the negative, reasoning that the text of the FSIA contains no such limitation.2
At issue were two subpoenas served on New York banks that sought information about
Argentina's "worldwide" assets, notwithstanding that the FSIA does not contemplate exe-
cution on sovereign property located abroad. The Court noted that "'other sources of
law,"' including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and principles of international com-
ity, "ordinarily will bear on the propriety of discovery requests of this nature and scope."3
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1. 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (2014).
2. Id. at 2256-58.
3. Id.
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Justice Ginsburg dissented, favoring an interpretation of the FSIA that would limit discov-
ery to sovereign property "used in connection with ... commercial activities," and noting
that the plaintiff had not shown "the sky [to] . . . be the limit" in foreign jurisdictions
either.4
In European Community v. RJ'R Nabisco, Inc., the Second Circuit for the first time held
that an entity created by numerous individual foreign states to qualify as a foreign-state
"organ" under the FSIA. The European Community argued that it should be considered
an "organ" of a foreign state-and therefore meets the definition of "foreign state"-
under the Act. 6 Applying the five-factor "organ" balancing test set forth in Filler v. Hanvit
Bank,7 the Second Circuit found that the European Community was created for a national
purpose, is supervised by its member states, holds exclusive rights in those nations, is
treated as a government entity under their laws, and has public employees.8 The Court
acknowledged that the member states themselves do not employ the public employees, but
found the distinction "of small importance," noting that in any event the "factors are
merely issues to be considered," and need not all be satisfied. 9
In Export-Import Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, the Second Circuit adopted the
strict "used for" test applied by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits to determine whether prop-
erty falls under Section 1610's threshold immunity exception requirement that the prop-
erty be "used for a commercial activity in the United States."1o Plaintiffs sought to satisfy
a judgment against Grenada by executing on funds owed by third parties to Grenadian
corporate entities, arguing that the funds' origin from purportedly commercial activity
meant that they were "used for" a commercial activity under Section 1610(a).11 The Sec-
ond Circuit, favoring the straightforward reading of the words "used for" adopted by the
other circuits, held that the relevant inquiry under Section 1610(a)'s "used for" exception
is not how the funds were generated but how the sovereign actively uses them, noting that
this approach is consistent with the structure and purpose of the FSIA, which affords
broader immunity from execution than from jurisdiction.12
In Calderon-Cardona v. Bank ofNew York Mellon, the Second Circuit considered, on first
impression, whether an electronic fund transfer (EFT) blocked midstream qualifies as sov-
ereign property subject to attachment under FSIA Section 1610(g). 3 The Court held that
Section 1610(g) does not preempt New York state property law governing EFTs, with the
result that the only entity with a property interest in a blocked EFT is the entity immedi-
ately preceding the blocking bank.14 The Second Circuit remanded the case to determine
whether a sovereign entity had transmitted any of the blocked EFTs directly to the block-
ing bank, thereby creating an attachable property interest in the funds."
4. Id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. 764 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2014).
6. Id. at 146, 144-48.
7. 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004).
8. R]R Nabisco, 764 F.3d at 145-48.
9. Id. at 146.
10. 768 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 2014).
11. Id. at 88-89.
12. Id. at 89-90.
13. 2014 WL 5368880 (2d Cir. 2014).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7.
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In Sachs v. Republic ofAustria, the Ninth Circuit ordered rehearing en banc to clarify
whether the commercial-activity exception applies when a state-owned commercial com-
mon carrier sells a passenger ticket through a travel agency in the United States.1 6 Re-
versing the courts below it, the en banc panel held that the FSIA does not abrogate
common law principles of agency and that, as a result, an authorized agent's commercial
activity in the United States can be imputed to a foreign state.17
II. International Service of Process
International service of process is governed by Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 4(f) requires that the means of international service of process comport
with due process and not be prohibited by an international agreement.'
In Freedom Watch, Inc. v. OPEC,1 9 the D.C. Circuit addressed international service of
process in a case involving the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC"). Freedom Watch, Inc., a political advocacy group, sued OPEC alleging that it
violated United States antitrust laws by fixing gasoline prices. Freedom Watch attempted
to serve OPEC by both hand delivering the complaint and mailing it through Austrian
mail to OPEC's headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to effectuate service and denied Freedom Watch's retroactive request to
allow service by alternative means under Rule 4(f)(3).2 0
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that Freedom Watch did not substan-
tially comply with Rule 4 and failed to effectuate service of process on OPEC because
Rule 4(h), not Rule 4(f), governs service of process on a foreign unincorporated associa-
tion such as OPEC, as opposed to an individual.2 1 Rule 4(h) allows service abroad on a
foreign business entity in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) except for personal
delivery. 22
The Court found that Rule 4(f)(1) could not apply in this case because there were no
"internationally agreed [upon] means of service" between Austria and the United States. 23
The Court explained that there are no "internationally agreed [upon] means of service"
with respect to OPEC since the United States and Austria are not signatories to any com-
mon international convention. The United States is not a party to the Hague Convention
on Civil Procedure (although Austria is) and Austria is not a party to the Hague Conven-
16. 737 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2013).
17. Id. at 592-94.
18. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1) (an individual may be served outside of the United States "by any internanon-
ally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) (allowing
service "by other means not prohibited by international agreement").
19. 766 F.3d 74 (2014).
20. Id.
21. The Court also noted that OPEC could not be served under the service provision of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a), because it was not "a political subdivision of a foreign state"
but rather "an intergovernmental organization whose members are foreign sovereign states." Freedom Watch,
766 F.3d at 79.
22. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(2).
23. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1).
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tion on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (although the United
States is). 24
Similarly, the Court found that Rule 4(f)(2) was also unavailing. Rule 4(f)(2) provides
that when there are "no internationally agreed means," service may be accomplished (1)
"as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country in its courts of
general jurisdiction"; (2) as directed by foreign authority in response to a "letter rogatory
or letter of request"; or (3) by personal service "unless prohibited by the foreign country's
law." 25 According to the Court, Freedom Watch could not effectuate service "as pre-
scribed by the foreign country's law" because under Austrian law, service of process is a
sovereign act that can only be done by a court unless an international convention provides
otherwise. 26 Additionally, Rule 4(f)(2) did not apply because there were no letters roga-
tory or letters of request by Freedom Watch and personal service is not allowed under
Rule 4(h). 27 The D.C. Circuit also noted that Freedom Watch's attempts at service vio-
lated Austrian law which prohibits service on an international organization holding privi-
leges and immunity and also bars service of legal process within OPEC's headquarters
without the express consent of OPEC's Secretary General.28
However, unlike the district court, the D.C. Circuit found that it could be possible for
Freedom Watch to effectuate service by serving OPEC's United States counsel if accom-
plished by order of the court after a proper application under Rule 4(f)(3), which allows
service "by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders." 29
While the appeals court agreed with the district court that service on OPEC through
counsel was barred under Rule 4(h), which allows service on an entity through an author-
ized agent, it found that service on counsel with court authorization could be effective
under Rule 4(f)(3). The appeals court recognized that authorization of alternative means
of service under Rule 4(f)(3) is at the court's discretion (even if the proposed means would
contravene foreign law), but because the district court had made no determination one
way or the other, it remanded with the instruction that the lower court "must at least
exercise its discretion under Rule 4(f)(3).30
III. Personal Jurisdiction
In early 2014, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Daimler AG v. Bau-
mann, arguably one of the most significant personal jurisdiction cases in years, which
sharply clarified the boundaries of general jurisdiction. 3' In Daimler, Argentine plaintiffs
filed suit in California against Daimler, a company headquartered in Germany, based on
human rights violations allegedly committed by Daimler's Argentine subsidiary in Argen-
tina. The Ninth Circuit held that it had general jurisdiction by using the agency theory of
24. Freedom Watch, 766 F.3d at 79.
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2)(A)-(C).
26. Freedom Watch, 766 F.3d at 80.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The Circuit found that Freedom Watch's other two proposed means of service under court authoriza-
tion (email and fax) "would constitute a substantial affront to Austrian law." Id. at 82 (citing Prewitt Enters.,
Inc. v. OPEC, 353 F.3d 916, 921 (11th Cir. 2003)).
30. Id. at 84.
31. 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
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personal jurisdiction to attribute all the "contacts" between California and Daimler's U.S.
subsidiary to the German parent company.
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "[t]he Ninth Circuit's agency theory ...
would sweep beyond even the 'sprawling view of general jurisdiction' we rejected in Good-
year."32 The Court found it need not address the theory directly because even "assum[ing]
[the subsidiary's] contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to sub-
ject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California."3 3 The Court rejected the contention
that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction wherever it "engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business" as "unacceptably grasping."34 Rather, gen-
eral jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is proper only when the corporation's affilia-
tions with the forum state are so "constant and pervasive" or "'continuous and systematic"
as to render it "essentially at home" in the forum state. 35 For a corporation, the paradigm
forum for general jurisdiction is the place of incorporation and principal place of business.
Because Daimler was not "at home" in California, the exercise of general jurisdiction did
not comply with due process. 36
Since the January 2014 decision, district courts in every circuit have applied Daimler's
narrow view of general jurisdiction, as have the Courts of Appeals of the Second, Fifth,
and Seventh and Ninth Circuits.37 The decision will have far-reaching consequences for
defendants, such as manufacturers of widely sold products, who were previously believed
to be subject to general jurisdiction in every state.
Cases resolving conflicts between Daimler and state long-arm statutes further illustrate
the immediate impact of Daimler on the jurisdictional landscape. For instance, in Brown v.
CBS Corp., a plaintiff advocated the exercise of general jurisdiction based on the defen-
dant's registration to do business in Connecticut.3 8 Although Connecticut's long-arm
statute expressly authorized the exercise of jurisdiction based on business registration, the
court declined to exercise jurisdiction because the defendant was not "at home" in Con-
necticut under Daimler. Similarly, in AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Del-
aware district court found that a defendant's "compliance with Delaware's registration
statutes-mandatory for doing business within the state-cannot constitute consent to
jurisdiction" in compliance with Daimler.39
The Supreme Court also issued a significant decision on specific jurisdiction in Walden
v. Fiore, narrowing the prevailing effects test and reiterating that personal jurisdiction can
only be found where the "defendant himself' creates contacts with the forum state.40 "It
is the defendant's conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State,"
and "mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum."4 1 Sub-
32. Id. at 759-60 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 761.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 763.
37. See Sonera Holding B.T v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Chinese-
Manufactured Dywall Prods. Liah. Litig., 753 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 2014); Snodgrass v. Berklee Coll. of Music,
559 F. App'x 541, 542 (7th Cir. 2014); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2014).
38. No. 3:12-cv-01495 (AWT), 2014 WIL 1924469, at *1 (D. Conn. May 14, 2014).
39. No. 14-696-GMS, 2014 WL 5780213, at *5 (D. Del. Nov. 5, 2014).
40. 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014).
41. Id. at 1122-23.
SPRING 2015
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
AN ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
164 THE YEAR IN REVIEW
sequently, courts of appeal applying Walden have come to different conclusions on the
significance of whether the defendant initiated the contact. For example, in CW Downer
& Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Science Corp., the First Circuit held that Walden does not require
courts to "focus too much on who initiated a particular contact." 4 2 But the Fifth Circuit,
in Monkton Ins. Services, Ltd. v. Ritter, declined jurisdiction because the defendant's com-
munications to the forum state were initiated by the plaintiff.4 3
IV. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of judicial review. It
requires U.S. courts to decline to pass judgment on the validity of official acts of a foreign
state performed in its own territory.4 4
A. DEFINING OFFICIAL SOVEREIGN ACTS
In Yale University v. Konowaloff, the plaintiff claimed title to Vincent van Gogh's painting
The Night Caf, which he alleged the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic confis-
cated from his great-grandfather pursuant to a 1918 decree abolishing private property,
and which subsequently came into the university's possession.45 Consistent with a 2012
decision of the Second Circuit involving the same plaintiff, the Connecticut district court
held that the act of state doctrine precluded the court from making "an inquiry into the
legal validity of the 1918 nationalization decree" since the successor state, the Russian
Federation, had not renounced it.46
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena also involved allegedly expropri-
ated art, in this instance a claim by the heir of a Dutch art dealer whose inventory was
looted by the Nazis. 47 The art works at issue were the subject of Dutch government
proceedings and subsequent transfer to a third party, who later transferred them to the
museum.
4 8 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal on preemption
grounds without resolving whether the case could survive the act of state doctrine. 49 The
appeals court directed the district court to determine whether the process by which the
42. No. 14-1327, 2014 WL 5861962, at *6 (1st Cir. Nob. 12, 2014) (finding specific personal jurisdiction
where parties' contacts involved no physical presence in Massachusetts, but were by phone, e-mail, and in-
ternet over an international border, even though many of those contacts were initiated by the in-forum
plaintiff).
43. 768 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2014).
44. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for
the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1997). See also WS. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl.
Tectonics Corp., Int'l., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990) (doctrine "requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of
foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid").
45. 5 F. Supp. 3d 237, 238-39 (D. Conn. 2014).
46. Id. at 241-42. See Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum ofArt, 702 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2012). In contrast, in
Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, the Second Circuit held that Iraq's claims that ABB conspired with the former
Iraqi regime, even if they involved an official act, were not barred by the act of state doctrine because it does
not "prevent the current government of a foreign state from repudiating the conduct of a prior government
on the foreign state's territory." 768 F.3d 145, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2014).
47. 754 F. 3d 712 (9th Cir. 2014).
48. Id. at 718.
49. Id.
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Dutch government transferred the property should be considered a sovereign act and, if
so, whether inquiry into its validity was required and would be barred by the act of state
doctrine. 0
In Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., the D.C. district court held that the act of state doctrine did
not bar claims by Indonesian citizens for grave injuries allegedly perpetrated by Indone-
sian soldiers employed by Exxon to provide security services. Exxon "made no showing
that plaintiffs were injured pursuant to official military orders,"" and, even if the acts were
sovereign, their "validity . . . as a matter of Indonesian law is not at issue in this case." 52
B. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In Du Daobin v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland addressed claims of Chinese political dissidents under the Alien Tort Statute
that Cisco assisted the Chinese Communist Party, acting under color of law, in the design
and implementation of a nation-wide surveillance program which was used "to identify
and torture dissidents," including plaintiffs13 The court held that the act of state doctrine
barred adjudicating the plaintiffs' claims because they "effectively ask[ed] the Court to
decide that the Chinese government . . . has engaged in multiple violations of interna-
tional law."14
Conversely, in Warfia v. Ali, the Virginia district court held that a Somali national's
claims under the Torture Victims Protection Act against a former colonel in the Somali
National Army were not barred by the act of state doctrine because jus cogens violations,
namely torture and attempted extrajudicial killing, are not "official sovereign acts" as con-
templated by the doctrine."
V. International Discovery
A. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
In 2014, several U.S. courts addressed the requirements for obtaining discovery for use
in proceedings before foreign or international tribunals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)56
and under the factors set out in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.s7
50. Id. at 726.
51. No. 01-1357(RCL), 2014 WL 4746256, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2014).
52. Id. at 6.
53. 2 F. Supp. 3d 717, 720 (D. Md. 2014).
54. Id. at 726.
55. No. 1:05-cv-701 (LMB/JFA), 2014 WL 3734121, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2014).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) ("The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding
in a foreign or international tribunal.").
57. 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004). In Intel, the Supreme Court noted three statutory requirements for invoking
Section 1782(a): (1) the discovery must be sought from a person residing in the district of the court to which
the application is made; (2) the discovery must be for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal; and (3) the
applicant must be a foreign or international tribunal or an interested person. In addition, the Court noted
several discretionary factors a court should consider in determining whether to grant discovery pursuant to
Section 1782(a). These factors include: (1) whether the person for whom discovery is sought is a participant
in the foreign proceeding; (2) the nature of the proceedings and the "receptivity" of the foreign court to
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Several cases discussed whether discovery was being sought from a "participant" in a
foreign proceeding. In Intel, the Supreme Court observed that "when the person from
whom discovery is sought is a participant in a foreign proceeding, the need for § 1782(a)
aid is generally not as apparent as . . . when evidence is sought from a non-participant."58
In In re Owl Shipping LLC59 and In re Request fir Subpoena by Ryanair Ltd. ,60 courts com-
pelled discovery from non-participants, whereas in In the Matter ofApplication of Leret, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the denial of a discovery
request on the grounds that the discovery target was "a party to two of the three foreign
proceedings" and had "voluntarily offer[ed] to submit to [applicants'] discovery requests in
Venezuela."61 Another court found that the mere fact that a defendant was a criminal
suspect in a related foreign criminal and civil proceeding "would not render him a partici-
pant," and granted the discovery request.62
Two courts addressed whether § 1782 requires that the material sought be located in
the United States. The Southern District of New York suggested that § 1782 imposes a
"threshold requirement" that documents sought be located in the United States, and
noted it had not been "persuaded ... that the documents sought are located in the United
States." However, it did not reach the issue because it found that the statutory require-
ments had not otherwise been met.6 3 On the other hand, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Delaware took a balancing approach, considering "comity and parity con-
cerns," and concluding that "while the four Intel factors favor granting discovery, the loca-
tion of the remaining documents [abroad] . . . tilt[s] the overall balance towards quashing
the discovery requests." 64
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
In 2014, several U.S. courts considered the discretionary factors in Socie'tJ Nationale In-
dustrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court fr the Southern District of Iowa in evaluating
discovery requests for information located in foreign jurisdictions for use in U.S.
proceedings. 65
United States federal court assistance; (3) whether the application is an attempt to circumvent foreign proof
gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country; and (4) whether the request is unduly burden-
some or intrusive. Id. at 264-65.
58. Id. at 244.
59. Case No. 14-5655 (AET), 2014 WL 5320192 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2014).
60. Case No. 5:14-mc-80270-BLF-PSG, 2014 WL 5088204 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2014).
61. Misc. Case No. 13-939(RCL-JMF), 2014 WL 1803573, at *3 (D.D.C. June 20, 2014).
62. In the matter of Application of Action & Prot. Found., No. C 14-80076 MISC EMC (LB), 2014 WL
2795832, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2014).
63. In re Petition of Certain Funds, Accounts, and/or Inv. Vehicles Managed by Affiliates ofFortress Inv. Grp. LLC,
No. 14 Civ. 1801(NRB), 2014 WL 3404955, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014).
64. Pinchuk v. Chemstar Prods. LLC, No. 13-mc-306-RGA, 2014 WIL 2990416, at *2 (D. Del. June 26,
2014).
65. 482 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) (holding that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means for obtaining
evidence located abroad); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(1)(c) (1987) (setting out five
factors: "[(1)] the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other information requested; [(2)] the
degree of specificity of the request; [(3)] whether the information originated in the United States; [(4)] the
availability of alternative means of securing the information; and [(5)] the extent to which noncompliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located"). Courts in the Second
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Following what has become the general trend in these cases, courts have continued the
trend toward ruling in favor of disclosure of foreign materials, even in the face of blocking
statutes with potential sanctions. In In re Activision Blizzard, Inc., the Delaware Court of
Chancery ordered discovery in the face of a blocking statute, holding that "Delaware has a
substantial interest in providing an effective forum for litigating disputes involving the
internal affairs of Delaware corporations," especially when the defendant had submitted to
the jurisdiction of Delaware courts.66 The Court also noted that the defendant had "cho-
sen previously to sue in the United States to take advantage of . .. American-style discov-
ery" and the decision "to disregard the Blocking Statute when advantageous undercut its
ability to invoke the Blocking Statute now." 67 Similarly, in BrightEdge Techs., Inc. v.
Searchmetrics, GmbH, the court ordered production despite German and EU data privacy
laws because those laws themselves stated that they did not apply to block discovery when
the "subject has given . . . consent" or the transfer of information is necessary to the
"exercise or defense of legal claims."68 And in Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., defendant
obtained discovery of a non-party Israeli bank, despite a contrary earlier ruling in a related
case,
69 because such discovery was "critically important in testing the veracity ... of plain-
tiff's [scienter] allegation."70
By contrast, U.S. courts have shown more willingness to show comity in favor of re-
straining discovery of materials located abroad where a foreign regulator intervenes or
otherwise informs a U.S. court that its own enforcement action would be impeded by U.S.
discovery. For example, in In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, the court
denied a request for production of a confidential European Commission decision in light
of "the EU's sovereign interest in governmental information produced within its bor-
ders."71 The court emphasized a letter supplied by the European Commission stating that
while its antitrust investigation was over, disclosure could frustrate ongoing aspects of its
cartel detection and enforcement initiatives. 72 The court added, "[tlhe EC also relies on
cooperation from U.S. law enforcement agencies, including the [Department of Justice],
and . . . the cooperation of U.S. and E.U. agencies is an aspect of comity." 73
VI. Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
A. ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Federal courts continued to grapple with the meaning of the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. that a claim must "touch and concern the
territory of the United States ... with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
Circuit also consider "the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought ...
[and] the good faith of the party resisting discovery." Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D.
517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
66. 86 A.3d 531, 547 (Ch. Del. 2014).
67. Id. at 550.
68. No. 14-cv-01009-WHO (MEJ), 2014 WL 3965062, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014).
69. Linde v. Arab Bank, P.L.C., 706 F.3d 92, 112 (2d Cir. 2013).
70. 298 F.R.D. 91, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
71. No. C 07-5944 SC MDL, 2014 WL 1247770, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014).
72. Id.
73. Id. at *3.
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extraterritorial application."7 4 Applying Kiobel, the Fourth Circuit refused to dismiss on
extraterritoriality grounds claims concerning abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, reason-
ing that the alleged torture was committed by United States citizens employed by an
American corporation under a federal government contract, that the acts took place at a
government-operated military facility, and that company managers in the United States
allegedly attempted to cover up the misconduct.75 Taken together, the court held, those
factors displaced the presumption against extraterritoriality.7 6
In Mastafa v. Chevron, the Second Circuit articulated a two-step test for determining
whether the extraterritoriality presumption has been overcome. 7 7 Drawing on the Su-
preme Court's earlier decision in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd. ,78 the Second
Circuit held that the first step is to isolate from the complaint the alleged conduct that
touches and concerns the United States to determine whether it is enough to displace the
presumption. Then the court must ask whether that same conduct also involves a viola-
tion of the ATS. Applying that process, the Second Circuit determined that a claim that
United States oil purchasers financed alleged human rights abuses by Saddam Hussein's
regime did touch and concern the United States. The complaint alleged that oil purchas-
ers had paid illegal surcharges to Hussein's regime, knowing that the extra payments were
financing abuses. But the claim failed on the second step because it alleged that defend-
ants acted "merely knowingly in aiding and abetting the underlying violations of the law of
nations," whereas Second Circuit precedent requires that the violation be purposeful. 79
The Eleventh Circuit similarly determined that Morrison's instruction about conduct
should be used to interpret "touch and concern" in the first step of the Morrison analysis.
In Baloco v. Drummond Co., the court decided that murders of union members by guerillas
in Colombia were extraterritorial, even though the union members worked for an Ameri-
can company, because the relevant conduct was outside the United States.80
B. FOURTH AND FITH AMENDMENTS
In Hernandez v. United States, the Fifth Circuit determined that a Mexican boy who was
standing in Mexico when he was shot in the face and killed by an agent standing in Texas
could not allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment by the agent.8' The court, applying
Supreme Court precedent, 82 held that the boy did not have sufficient connections with the
United States to invoke the Fourth Amendment.83 But the court decided that the "suffi-
cient connections" test did not apply to the Fifth Amendment and applied factors derived
74. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
75. AIShimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528-29 (4th Cir. 2014) (remanding on the political
question issue).
76. Id. at 530-31.
77. 770 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014).
78. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
79. Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 191-94 (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
260 (2d Cir. 2009)).
80. 767 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2014).
81. 757 F.3d 249, reh'g en banc granted, 2014 WL 5786260 (5th Cir. 2014). The boy's parents also brought
a claim under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging that the shooting violated several treaties, but the court of
appeals held that the United States had not consented to suit. See id. at 259.
82. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
83. Id. at 266.
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from Boumediene v. Bush84 to determine that the boy had Fifth Amendment rights. The
court noted that while not an American citizen, the boy did not have an "enemy alien"
status that militated against application of the Fifth Amendment.85 Moreover, the nature
of the sites where the alleged violation occurred, on the border of the United States and
Mexico, suggested that the United States had some control over the area. 86 And the court
noted that if the Fifth Amendment did not apply in this situation to protect against "arbi-
trary conduct that shocks the conscience," no other sovereign would be able to force the
agent to answer for his act committed in the United States.87 The Fifth Circuit recently
granted rehearing en banc of the decision.
C. SECURITIEs LAW
In several cases, the Second Circuit refined its application of Morrison. In City of Pontiac
Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement System v. UBS AG, it held that where foreign securities
were purchased on foreign exchanges, the fact that the securities were cross-listed on do-
mestic exchanges was not enough to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.88
In Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, the Second Circuit decided that the rule of Morrison also
barred extraterritorial application of the Commodities Exchange Act.89 And in a case in-
terpreting Dodd-Frank, the court held that its whistleblower provisions do not apply
extraterritorially.90
D. RICO
The Second Circuit determined that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) can apply extraterritorially, but only where the statute containing the
relevant RICO predicate itself permits extraterritorial application.91 The court acknowl-
edged that its holding diverged from that of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Chao Fan
Xu, which found a general "presumption that RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a
civil or criminal context." 92
VII. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
In U.S. courts, the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitration Awards, otherwise known as the "New York Convention," governs the recog-
84. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
85. Id. at 268-69.
86. Id. at 269-70.
87. Id. at 270-71.
88. 752 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2014).
89. 764 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2014).
90. Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014)
91. European Cmty. v. R]R Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2014).
92. Id. at 139 n.6 (citing United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2013)).
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nition and enforcement of most foreign arbitral awards. 93 However, State law governs the
recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments. 94
A. FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
In BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, the Supreme Court held 7-2 that arbitrators
acted within their power in concluding that a bilateral investment treaty between the
United Kingdom and Argentina did not obligate a private investor to bring its claims
under the treaty before an Argentine court prior to arbitration. 95 The arbitrators had
found that they had jurisdiction to decide the merits of a dispute arising under the treaty
despite the fact that BG Group, by bringing its claims directly to arbitration, had bypassed
the investment treaty's requirement that any dispute be brought first in Argentina and at
least eighteen months prior to any arbitration.96 The Supreme Court (Breyer, J.) agreed,
holding that the arbitrators had jurisdiction to decide the issue because the local litigation
requirement, which "determines when the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not whether
there is a contractual duty to arbitrate," was procedural rather than substantive. 97 The
Court concluded that courts reviewing an arbitrator's decision as to whether it has juris-
diction in a dispute regarding a treaty with a local litigation provision must do so with
"considerable deference."98 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing
that submitting the dispute to the courts is a "condition on consent to arbitrate" and
therefore "whether an investor has complied with that requirement is a question a court
must decide de novo, rather than an issue for the arbitrator to decide subject only to the
most deferential judicial review." 99
In Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Government of the Lao People's Democratic Re-
public, the District Court for the Southern District of New York revisited its 2011 judg-
ment enforcing an arbitral award after the Malaysian High Court vacated that award in
2012.100 The Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, which had suc-
ceeded in having the arbitral award vacated in Malaysia, moved to vacate the district
court's judgment pursuant to Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention.O1 Noting that
a court may enforce "an arbitral award that has been nullified by a court in the state with
primary jurisdiction over [it] ... only when the foreign judgment setting aside the award is
93. The U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, is implemented in U.S. law through Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2013). The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration gov-
erns the recognition and enforcement of awards if a majority of the parties to an arbitration agreement are
citizens of states that have ratified the convention, and this convention is implemented in U.S. law through
Chapter 3 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2013).
94. Many states have passed some version of the Uniform Foreign-Country MoneyJudgments Recognition
Act.
95. 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1210 (2014).
96. Id. at 1204-05.
97. Id. at 1207.
98. Id. at 1210.
99. Id. at 1221 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
100. 997 F. Supp. 2d 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
101. Id. at 215.
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repugnant to fundamental notions" of decency and justice, the court declined to enforce
the award.1 02
B. FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
In Commissions Import Export S.A. v. Republic of the Congo, the D.C. Circuit joined the
Second Circuit in holding that Chapter 2 of the Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention Act
("FAA"), which implements the New York Convention, does not preempt state law recog-
nition of foreign court judgments.o 3 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit considered whether
the statute of limitations to enforce arbitral awards in FAA Chapter 2 preempted the
longer period to enforce foreign money judgments under the D.C. Uniform Foreign-
Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The court concluded that Congress did not
intend Chapter 2 of the FAA-which makes no mention of foreign court judgments-to
preempt state law governing the issue.10 4 Instead, section 207 of the FAA "applies specifi-
cally to the confirmation of 'arbitral award[s] falling under the Convention.'"105 The
court reasoned that "it is unlikely that Congress would have intended its implementation
of the New York Convention to cover both arbitral awards and judgments without men-
tioning the latter in FAA Chapter 2."106
VIII. Forum Non Conveniens
In Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court fr the Western District of Texas,
the Supreme Court provided clarity on the proper mechanism for enforcing forum-selec-
tion clauses.1 0 7 Although Atlantic Marine involved a domestic, rather than an interna-
tional, forum dispute, the case answers important procedural questions concerning the
enforcement of forum-selection clauses in both the domestic and international context.
The court made two important holdings impacting frum non conveniens litigation: (1) a
forum-selection clause electing a state or foreign forum should be enforced throughforum
non conveniens, and (2) a forum-selection clause alters the private and public interest analy-
sis such that the private interest factors weigh entirely in favor of the forum designated by
the forum-selection clause and the court may only consider the public interest factors.1 0
The contract between the parties was to be performed in Texas but included a forum-
selection clause designating Virginia as the appropriate forum.109 After a dispute arose
and the plaintiff brought suit in the Western District of Texas, the defendant moved to
dismiss on venue grounds.11o The district court denied the motion, and the Fifth Circuit
denied the defendant's subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that where a
forum-selection clause designates a non-federal forum, Rule 12(b)(3) provides the proper
102. Id. at 223 (internal citations omitted).
103. 757 F.3d 321, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
104. Id. at 326-29.
105. Id. at 327.
106. Id. at 332.
107. At. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
108. Id. at 580-82.
109. Id. at 575.
110. Id. at 576.
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avenue for dismissal."' The Supreme Court reversed, finding thatforum non conveniens,
rather than Rule 12(b)(3), is the appropriate enforcement mechanism when a forum-selec-
tion clause points to a state or foreign forum.112
The Fifth Circuit's holding in Cotemar S.A. De C. V v. Hornbeck Ofjhore Services, L.L. C.
illustrates how an atypical time bar can affect theforum non conveniens analysis.113 Cotemar
involved a limitation of liability proceeding-a procedure in maritime law by which a ship
owner seeks to limit his liability to the value of his vessel.11 4 In Cotemar, the parties'
vessels collided forty-four miles off of the coast of Mexico." 5 Defendant filed two peti-
tions in Mexican courts to limit liability.11 6 Under Mexican limitation of liability proce-
dure, claimants had to file their claims within a certain time.11 7 The plaintiff failed to file
a timely claim in the Mexico court and instead brought suit in federal district court in
Texas after the deadline passed; the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of
forum non conveniens.11s After the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss,
the Fifth Circuit remanded for more specific findings as to whether the district court's
return jurisdiction clause adequately addressed the time bar presented by the plaintiffs
failure to file a claim in the limitation of liability proceedings in Mexico.11 9 It held that
the district court must determine whether its return jurisdiction clause comports with the
Fifth Circuit's prior holding that a plaintiff may not claim a private interest in a federal
forum where unavailability of a foreign forum is a "plight of his own making."1 20 The
appeals court further observed that the district court's instruction to "waiv[e] any jurisdic-
tional defenses" and to "'submit fully' to the Mexican judicial proceedings" could require
"Appellees to waive any legitimate defenses relating to untimeliness that Appellees may
have acquired based on Appellants' lack of diligence."121 Wyhile not explicitly stated, the
court alludes to the maritime law principle that a defendant's waiver of his right to limit
liability as to one party impacts the rights of other parties, as the "'concursus' of claims
compels all actions arising out of the casualty to be filed and disposed of in a single
proceeding."1 2 2
IX. Parallel Proceedings
In Ace Arts, LLC v. Sony/ATVMusic Publishing, LLC, the Southern District of New York
refused to stay a lawsuit involving the use of Beatles songs in a documentary about the
band because of another pending lawsuit in English courts. 123 The court declined to de-
part from the general rule permitting simultaneous proceedings in the same in personam
111. Id.
112. Id. at 580.
113. 569 F. App'x 187 (5th Cir. 2014).
114. See 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-1 (5th ed.).
115. Cotemar S.A. De C.V., 569 F. App'x at 189.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 191.
118. Id. at 189.
119. Id. at 190.
120. Veba-ChemieA.G. v. MV Getafix, 711 F.2d 1243, 1248 n.10 (5th Cir. 1983).
121. Id. at 191.
122. 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Mar. Law § 15-5 (5th ed.).
123. No. 13-cv-7307, 2014 WL 4804465 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2014).
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claim, given that the parties and the claims in the two proceedings were not sufficiently
the same, the English litigation was not sufficiently advanced, and the future preclusive
effect of any judgment from that court was uncertain.124
In Clientron Corp. v. Devon IT, Inc.,'125 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania similarly declined to stay an action to enforce a foreign arbitration award
while defendant sought to set the award aside in a parallel proceeding in Taiwan. Apply-
ing the six-factor test of Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc.,126 the court con-
cluded that arbitration's purpose of a speedy resolution of disputes counseled against a
stay, that plaintiff properly filed its enforcement action in a U.S. court because defendant
was a U.S. company, and that defendant did not provide security for the stay period.
The Eleventh Circuit in GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Belize, addressed a comparatively rare
case where plaintiff sought to apply international comity prospectively to dismiss or stay a
case before the filing of any actual parallel foreign proceeding.1 27 Holding that the district
court improperly dismissed breach-of-contract claims against Belize in favor of litigation
in that country's courts, the court of appeals noted that "[p]rospective international com-
ity requires a serious problem that would be created by [domestic] proceedings but that
would not be present if the matter were adjudicated abroad."1 28 Distinguishing its 2004
decision in Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG,1 29 the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that
the United States had no significant interest in the foreign adjudication, and submitted no
statement of interest, and that Belize's preference to handle the suit in its own courts was
"not a cognizable prospective international comity interest."1 30
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, affirmed the dismissal on prospective comity grounds
of state-law personal injury claims brought by Colombian citizens against U.S. companies
for alleged complicity in the bombing of plaintiffs' village by the Colombian military.131
In Mujica v. Airscan, Inc., the Ninth Circuit distinguished earlier precedent and held that a
"'true conflict between domestic and foreign law'" is not required in instances of "adjudi-
catory comity."1 32 Courts within the Ninth Circuit had previously found that comity is
only proper where a true conflict existed.133 The Mujica decision clarifies that the "true
conflict" inquiry is a threshold issue only for prescriptive (or legislative) comity, and just
"one factor in, rather than a prerequisite to, the application of [adjudicatory] comity." 34
124. Id. at *4-*5.
125. No. 13-05634, 2014 WL 940406 (E.D. Penn. March 10, 2014).
126. 156 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1998).
127. 749 F.3d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 2014).
128. Id. at 1031-34.
129. 379 F.3d 1227, 1239-41 (11th Cir. 2004) (abstaining from considering claims against German banks to
recover assets stolen during the Nazi era in favor of a claims-resolution mechanism established under an
agreement between the United States and Germany as the exclusive forum for such claims).
130. GDG Acquisitions, 749 F.3d at 1031-33.
131. Mujica v. Airscan, Inc., 2014 WL 5839817 Id. at *1, *11-*27.
132. 2014 WL 5839817 at *15 (quoting In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 1998)).
133. See, e.g., Oak Point Partners, Inc. v. Lessing, No. 11-03328, 2013 WL 1703382 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2013).
Indeed, the dissenting judge in Mujica disagreed that In re Simon was solely a prescriptive comity case. See
Mujica, 2014 WL 5839817 at *32 (Zilly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Mujica, 2014 WL 5839817 at *16.
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